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Chapter 7
United States Pension Beneﬁt Plan
Design Innovation: Labor Unions
as Agents of Change
David S. Blitzstein
Above all, strong but independent employee representation is required
on the governing boards of the pension funds. Both the present job and
the future pension are employee interests. Both require guardianship
for the employee through his representatives . . . and as a good many
American labor leaders learned from New York City, the integrity of the
employee’s pension fund assets (increasingly the employee’s main asset,
and his main resource next to his job) needs to be protected. (Drucker
1976: 146)
In the present crisis, unions continue to shoulder their traditional
responsibilities of being spokesmen for employees in demanding that
economic and political leaders take steps to propel the economy
forward. The new question is whether the unions should also accept
part of the responsibility of deﬁning the policies, the directions,
programs and projects for these ends, so as to help their following
attain the desired level of high economic activity, and the rising
economic and social well-being to which unions are committed.
What steps should they take to discharge these responsibilities com-
petently? (Barkin 1983: 425)
The study of retirement and pension beneﬁt design for the past 30 years has
traditionally concentrated on the economics and behavioral features of
deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) and deﬁned contribution (DC) delivery systems. Little
has been written about the institutions that sponsor and drive the direction
of pension beneﬁt design in our society. One institution that has shaped the
United States retirement system in the post-World War II era is the labor
movement. In fact, labor unions played a key role in establishing DB
pensions for millions of workers in the late 1940s. The stage was set by the
success and ingenuity of larger-than-life union leaders including Sidney
Hillman and John L. Lewis, who established industry-wide multiemployer
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pension plans in the clothing and coal industries. Their early efforts in
achieving collectively bargained pension plans set the pattern for other
major industries like steel and auto. By 1950, the United Steel Workers
and the United Auto Workers negotiated company pension plans with the
major industry employers (Sass 1997).
The US DB pension system was not created in the corridors of Congress.
Instead, it emerged from a messy process of labor–management negoti-
ations involving industrial strife, contentious litigation, and threats of gov-
ernment intervention. Peter Drucker (1976) and Solomon Barkin (1983),
whose statements introduce this chapter, were prescient observers and
commentators on the role of corporations and unions in the twentieth
century. Both experts looked beyond pure market economics, to focus
instead on the role of institutions to better understand social, economic,
and political events and trends. They especially identiﬁed with and studied
the role of labor unions as economic decision-makers. This chapter focuses
on the role that unions have played, and can play in the future, in redesign-
ing the US pension system.
Today, the DB system is in the throes of an existential crisis. Pension plans
that organized labor helped create in the mid-twentieth century went into
decline after 1980 and were displaced by DC plans. The decline of the DB
plan system over this period correlates closely with the decline of organized
labor in the US. Moreover, two ﬁnancial shocks during the ﬁrst decade of
the twenty-ﬁrst century deeply challenged DB plans’ very existence. But if
change and Schumpeterian ‘creative destruction’ are natural outcomes of
capitalism, then the questions of how social and economic change is man-
aged and what replaces moribund institutions become worthy of thought
and study.
In the next 20 years, the US will experience a transformation of
the occupational pension system. How this transition is managed and
the form it takes will determine retirement outcomes for much of the
American workforce. Even though the US labor movement has been
weakened, it is still strategically positioned in a number of high-proﬁle
private sector industries and ﬁrms. Moreover, unions still play a domin-
ant role in the public sector. This puts labor unions in a unique role to
renegotiate the pension social contract in key parts of the American
economy.
In this chapter, we relate through a case study how one labor union, the
United Food and Commercial Workers International Union (UFCW),
sought to manage an ongoing crisis among its collectively bargained multi-
employer pension plans by introducing a hybrid plan to replace its trad-
itional DB pension plans. In what follows, we describe the development of
that hybrid plan and how it gained inﬂuence beyond the UFCW and the
industries it represents.
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Multiple Financial Crises in the 2000s Destabilize
the UFCW’s Traditional Deﬁned Beneﬁt Plans
The UFCW is a North American labor union with 1.3 million members in
the US and Canada. Its membership predominately works in retail food and
food manufacturing, and upwards of 90 percent of its membership is
covered by collectively bargained pension plans. Two-thirds of the UFCW
membership, mostly in the retail food supermarket industry, participate in
DB multiemployer pensions administered by joint boards of trustees equally
represented by labor and management. The UFCW and thousands of sig-
natory employers together sponsor 60 multiemployer plans with $25 billion
in assets covering a total of 1.4 million active workers, inactive workers who
have earned a non-forfeitable beneﬁt, and retirees. The current ratio of
active to inactive participants is about 1:1. UFCW members work in low to
moderate wage industries characterized by high turnover and part-time
work. The average DB pension beneﬁt is only $500–$600 per month, at
present. Some long-service career members do receive pensions that are
multiples of three to ﬁve times the stated pension.
As they entered the twenty-ﬁrst century, most UFCW multiemployer
pension plans were strongly funded using expected return assumptions
averaging 7.5 percent. Illusory funding surpluses that emerged during the
frothy capital markets of the 1990s were used for beneﬁt improvements
including expensive early retirement subsidies. Funding policy discipline
waned as bargaining parties agreed to multi-year contribution holidays.
Perverse federal tax policy that capped the tax deductibility of employer
contributions for fully funded pension plans promoted bad behavior by
stakeholders. A herd mentality also drove sponsors to invest aggressively
in high volatility growth assets, and 60–70 percent allocations to stock were
the norm.
When the Tech Bubble in stocks burst beginning in 2000, DB pensions
were unprepared for a ‘perfect storm’ of asset drawdowns and declining
interest rates. Funding ratios dropped by over 30 percentage points, on
average, as markets slid for three consecutive years, something not experi-
enced since the market crash in 1973–4. The UFCW’s response to these new,
gaping funding deﬁcits was multi-faceted. At the fund level, trustees started
assessing investment risk more seriously by diversifying portfolios away from
public equity. At the bargaining table, labor and management crafted new
pension funding agreements that increased employer contributions and
reduced future service beneﬁt accruals. A number of these funding agree-
ments had automatic trigger mechanisms that required changes in contri-
butions and beneﬁts based on certain projected actuarial events.
The plans began improving their funding position after 2003, but it
became apparent that funding recovery would be slow and that some
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plans had been badly damaged. Many were projected to trigger the dire
regulatory status called ‘minimum funding deﬁciency’ under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), which would impose onerous
lump-sum contributions and surtaxes on employers. These events stimu-
lated a movement to reform the federal pension funding rules, culminating
in Congress passing the Pension Protection Act (PPA) in 2006. This was the
ﬁrst major reform of pension funding rules since ERISA became law in 1974
and the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act (MPPAA) was passed
in 1980. The UFCW took an active role in lobbying for PPA, joining the retail
food industry employers and the National Coordinating Committee for
Multiemployer Plans (NCCMP), the multiemployer community lobbying
arm, in an effective labor–management coalition.
The PPA created a range of funding zone certiﬁcations for multiemployer
plans from ‘safe’ (green zone) to ‘endangered’ (yellow zone) to ‘critical’
(red zone). Plans are required to annually certify their zone status to the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS). If a plan certiﬁes yellow zone (<80 percent
funded), the plan trustees have 270 days to implement a Funding Improve-
ment Plan (FIP) that returns the plan to ﬁnancial health within 10–13 years.
If the plan certiﬁes red zone (<65 percent funded), the trustees must
promulgate a Rehabilitation Plan (RP) that returns the plan to ﬁnancial
health within 10–13 years. Both FIP and RP plans provide direction and
funding discipline to the collective bargaining parties. Red zone plans had
the ability for the ﬁrst time under ERISA to reduce or eliminate accrued
early retirement and disability beneﬁts for all plan participants except
retirees (PBGC 2013).
Pension plans had not yet recovered from the asset drawdowns of the
Tech Bubble when they were struck by the devastating shock of the Great
Financial Crisis of 2008–09. Many plans lost the equivalent of 30 percentage
points of funding in one year, and 70 percent of multiemployer plans
certiﬁed yellow or red zone in 2009. The funding damage was so dramatic
that in 2008 Congress passed an amendment to PPA titled the Worker,
Retiree, and Employer Recovery Act (WRERA), which allowed plans to
defer actions required under PPA for one year. A second phase of Congres-
sional action in 2010 with the Pension Relief Act (PRA) allowed multi-
employer plans to amortize investment losses incurred in 2008–09 over
29 years, in contrast to the ﬁfteen-year period legislated by PPA.
The UFCW Assesses the Damage of the
Twenty-First-Century Pension Crisis
The UFCW reacted aggressively to these ﬁnancial threats by conducting an
internal review and critique of its pension plans unconstrained by prior
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beliefs or union politics. The union’s response was somewhat unique due to
two institutional advantages. First, it had created an internal staff capability
and expertise to advise the leadership on all matters related to pensions and
health insurance. Secondly, the union leadership, to its credit, had the
conﬁdence to objectively evaluate bad news and consider unconventional
solutions that would resolve serious problems undermining the beneﬁt
security of its membership.
In early 2006, in anticipation of PPA legislation, the union conducted a
funding analysis of its plans by applying a number of Pension Beneﬁt
Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) funding and solvency screens to measure
plan sustainability. The results were sobering. Two-thirds of the UFCW’s
plans triggered two or more of the PBGC’s screens, and more than a third of
the UFCW’s plans were less than 70 percent funded. Just as troubling, a
number of UFCW funds that had been fully funded in 2006 were now
projected to have minimum funding deﬁciency problems in 10 years or
fewer, and they could be expected to trigger yellow or red zone status in four
to ﬁve years based on draft PPA legislation.
At the same time that the UFCW was conducting its internal pension
study, a number of accounting, ﬁnancial, and regulatory pressures were
being felt. The Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB) proposed
new rules that would have required multiemployer plan corporate sponsors
to report unfunded liabilities on their income and balance sheets at market
value using risk-free rates, instead of the plan’s discount rate. In addition,
credit rating agencies like Moody’s and Standard & Poor began to research
multiemployer plan sponsors and industries, highlighting the growth in off-
balance sheet pension debt by ﬁrm and industry (Moody’s 2006). Concur-
rently, Congress tripled multiemployer plan premiums to the PBGC, which
was itself experiencing growing deﬁcits, and required plans to report a
current liability funding ratio based on annuity rates that suggested even
weaker funding ratios for plans.
This conﬂuence of events served as the background to the internal UFCW
pension study presented to the union’s leadership in spring 2006. The
report raised for the ﬁrst time a series of difﬁcult policy questions for the
UFCW’s leadership. One was whether UFCW multiemployer plans were
ﬁnancially sustainable, and what the cost of plan sustainability might be.
Another focused on whether signatory employers could afford this cost
given the competitive environment. Additionally, the report asked what
the ramiﬁcations of the pension crisis for the stability of the UFCW’s
collective bargaining system might be, focusing on the economic trade-offs
for the union and its members. Reviewing the options in light of the pension
crisis, and assuming pension beneﬁts could be frozen for a generation,
raised questions about the economic consequences for members’ retire-
ment incomes. And crucially, if a union deemed its current plans to be
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unsustainable, the question arose as to what alternative plan designs might
be considered.
These policy questions raised a series of political dilemmas for the UFCW,
which also became the subject of discussion. Questions arose about how the
membership and local union leaders might respond to the pension crisis,
and whether the membership might internalize its fear and anger against
the union leaders. Additionally, leaders worried that the UFCW and its
sponsored plans might be subject to litigation. Naturally, questions were
raised about whether the membership would support a strategy by the union
to reform and redesign its plans. Of course, any reform would raise the issue
of how the union would manage intergenerational equity issues as pension
beneﬁts became more differentiated between demographic groups based
on when they began working in the industry. And ﬁnally, there were con-
cerns that pension plan failures might inhibit the UFCW’s ability to organize
and attract new members.
After assessing the political risks, the UFCW leadership opted for a pro-
active, solution-based approach to the pension crisis, deciding that the status
quo was more dangerous than renegotiating a new pension contract.
The Question of DB Plan Sustainability
The pension crisis that started in the ﬁrst decade of the twenty-ﬁrst century
coincided with a number of emerging structural trends synonymous with
the maturing life cycle of these plans, many of which were 50–60 years old.
Plan demographics had changed dramatically due to stagnant union growth
and the impact of technological change. The absolute number and growth
of retirees each year exceeded additions to the active worker population,
which was the basis for employer contributions. Active pension participants
were now supporting one to two inactive participants, a reversal from earlier
decades when the plans were new and growing (Kocken 2011).
These demographic trends generated net negative cash ﬂows to the DB
plans, with annual beneﬁt and administrative payments exceeding annual
employer contributions. Not surprisingly, this created a drag on asset growth
and an additional burden on expected investment returns. Additionally,
negative cash ﬂows were projected to nearly double over the next decade, in
a number of UFCW plans.
Another characteristic of mature DB pensions is that they become quite
dependent on investment income, making the plans particularly sensitive to
investment return volatility. Investment income in mature pension plans
accounts for 70–80 percent of total annual income. And as many DB plans
discovered in the last decade, investment volatility can dramatically affect
the plan’s funding balance. As the assets of mature pension plans grow, they
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become even more vulnerable to the rule of large numbers. A 10 percent
drawdown on $1 billion is 10 times that on a $100 million asset base. Larger
pension plans are also highly leveraged, with assets equal to multiples of
30–50 times contributions. This makes it nearly impossible to recover from
large asset drawdowns by increasing employer contributions.
Modern portfolio theory failed the DB pension system during the ﬁrst
decade of the twenty-ﬁrst century. Pension portfolios that were assumed to
be highly diversiﬁed, turned out to actually be highly correlated with public
equity risk and therefore vulnerable to major asset declines. The secular
decline in interest rates compounded the perfect ﬁnancial storm facing
pension plans. In reaction to the threat of depression, extraordinary mon-
etary policy exercised by the Federal Reserve sent interest rates even lower,
adding to the investment pressures on pension plans. DB pensions with long
liability durations faced challenging asset liability mismatches, when long
bond rates were below 4 percent. At the same time, the situation created
perverse incentives for plans to take more investment risk than they could
manage, in an effort to earn expected returns of 7–8 percent. The mature
DB pension model became hypersensitive to capital market volatility: a few
years of negative returns destroyed a decade of asset growth and defunded
once-healthy DB plans, driving many into a death spiral.
Inspirations for Beneﬁt Design and
Governance Innovation
This structural analysis of traditional DB plans convinced the UFCW that the
sustainability of their pension system was at risk, requiring it to search for
alternatives. This was in keeping with its history of innovating in the pension
arena. In 1984, the UFCW National Pension Fund took advantage of high
interest rates and eliminated its unfunded liabilities by purchasing an annu-
ity fromMetLife for the plan’s past-service liability at highly favorable prices.
That transaction allowed the plan to restart the fund as a future-service-only
plan. Groups differentiated by area and industry were experience-rated
separately based on their individual demographics, but they continued to
share investment and administrative experience. The new future service
plan was conservatively funded through a regimented process where the
plan recalculated the actuarial cost of beneﬁts every two to three years and
required the collective bargaining parties to reset contributions given the
updated costs. This structure gave the plans a DC-type quality, where labor
and management determined the contribution/beneﬁt formulas that ﬁt
their special market conditions. This unique funding/beneﬁt system, with
its self-adjusting mechanisms, was a major reason why the UFCW National
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Pension Fund remained fully funded and retained a PPA green zone status
throughout the crisis.
Another example of UFCW design/governance creativity was seen with a
plan sponsored by UFCW Local 1518 in British Columbia, Canada. The
trustees of that multiemployer plan foresaw the secular decline in interest
rates in the 1990s, and they made a politically courageous decision to move
away from a model that measured liabilities based on expected returns to
one that targeted liabilities to certain market interest rates. Instead of
spending transitory surpluses on beneﬁt improvements during the mid-
1990s, the Local 1518 Plan adjusted its beneﬁt liabilities to market interest
rates and adopted a highly effective liability driven investment program that
maintained a fully funded status despite the storms of the ﬁrst decade of the
twenty-ﬁrst century. The experience of the UFCW Local 1518 Plan sug-
gested a viable investment risk management model worth emulating.
An important inﬂuence on UFCW staff was its consultations with
Keith Ambachtsheer, an internationally recognized pension strategist and
big-picture thinker. Ambachtsheer conceived of DB plans as complex
risk sharing arrangements, and he devised rules of the ‘pension deal’ based
on a contractual model where terms must be clear and transparent
(Ambachtsheer 2007). His view that risk sharing must be fair and symmet-
rical provided a theoretical framework for the UFCW to benchmark its ideas
for building a hybrid plan. The Ambachtsheer principles of a clearly stated
targeted pension beneﬁt, a clearly stated expected cost of delivering the
target beneﬁt, a clearly stated risk-bearing deal between the various stake-
holder groups, and a clear statement about how risk would be managed
within the pension plan, formed the philosophical building blocks for the
UFCW beneﬁt design. In addition, Ambachtsheer’s work with leaders in two
of the world’s most successful retirement systems, the Canadian and Dutch,
offered best practice insights into achieving optimum governance and bene-
ﬁt design.
The UFCW was also inﬂuenced by the 2006 introduction of a ‘Retirement
Shares Plan’ (RSP) conceived by Don Fuerst and Mercer Consulting (see
Fuerst 2015). The RSP was a form of Variable Beneﬁt Plan established by
IRS Revenue Rulings in the 1950s, which allowed accrued beneﬁts to vary
based on plan investment performance. Variable Beneﬁt Plans fell out of
favor after the 1973–4 market crash, when these plans had no choice but to
enforce severe cuts in retiree beneﬁts. One important Variable Beneﬁt Plan
that did survive is the Pension Plan of the Major League Baseball Players.
RSP is similar to a DB career accumulation pension: a percentage of each
year’s pay is used to buy retirement shares at the year-end purchase price of
the shares. The beneﬁt earned each year then varies with investment per-
formance. The employee can change the investment mix each year and
adjust his individual risk. At the normal retirement age, the employee
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receives an annual retirement income based on the number of retirement
shares accumulated over his working life. During retirement, annual
income also varies with investment performance (Fuerst 2006). The RSP
risk sharing approach became a model for the UFCW beneﬁt design project.
Deciding on Pension Design Priorities: The UFCW
Evaluation Process
The UFCW constituted a team of pension experts, including legal experts,
actuaries, and pension investment consultants, to research and develop a
new hybrid design from late 2006 through 2009. In early deliberations, the
UFCW pension task force (the Committee) began formulating its goals and
objectives. A substantial part of this discussion focused on pension legacy
issues and how to transition to a new pension system. While these legacy and
transition issues are critically important, they are not the subject of this
chapter (see Blitzstein 2013).
The Committee began its work by rejecting the traditional DB and DC
models. The UFCW’s concerns about the recurring structural ﬂaws in the
traditional DB plan were as already described. The ﬁnancial crisis had
effectively exposed the myth that all investment risk in DB plans could be
absorbed by employers, since participants’ experience with multiple rounds
of pension beneﬁt reductions suggested otherwise. At the same time, the
UFCW recognized the various risks facing corporate plan sponsors. Changes
in pension accounting rules, the opinions of credit rating agencies, and the
ability of ﬁrms to withstand the balance sheet volatility of DB pension
liabilities had to be recognized by the UFCW in its new plan design exercise.
Avoiding the risk of generating new unfunded pension liabilities became a
priority in the UFCW design exercise.
The Committee considered adopting 401(k) plans, but these were rejected
because their design imposed unacceptable risks on workers and retirees.
These plans’ direct shifting of investment, mortality, and retirement risk to
participants ruled them out. The Committee was also suspicious of the
behavioral economics foibles relevant to DC plans, regarding participant
contribution and investment decisions. In addition, the low-to-moderate
wage levels in the industries represented by the UFCW raised questions
about whether DC plans could generate affordable and adequate retirement
beneﬁts. A further consideration was DC plans’ inability to provide early
retirement options, disability beneﬁts, and lifetime annuities.
Similarly, the Committee also rejected cash balance plans as these did not
offer an equitable alignment of risk between employees and employers.
In particular, employees gained no upside investment opportunity, and
employers were still at risk for investment downturns. The fact that annual
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ﬂoor accruals decrease with age also presented the UFCW with concerns
about intergenerational conﬂicts among its membership. Another problem
was that cash balance plan forfeitures from turnover automatically reduced
employer costs, instead of remaining in the plan asset pool. A ﬁnal negative
regarding cash balance design was these plans’ emphasis on lump sum
payment at retirement instead of lifetime annuities.
This exercise of evaluating existing plan designs was valuable because it
focused the UFCW’s efforts to build its own customized retirement model.
While the Mercer Retirement Shares Plan did offer some useful aspects, it
did have some features that were contrary to UFCW’s goals and principles.
For example, the UFCW rejected the concept of employee investment
choice within the risk-sharing structure of RSP, and so it did not adopt the
RSP beneﬁt variability feature for retiree beneﬁts.
The internal discussion produced a new plan set of design goals, which
included the following:
• Beneﬁts should be fairly priced using interest rates more representative
of long-term historic interest rates.
• The new plan design had to be structured in a way that aggressively
managed investment risk.
• The new plan design had to support stable employer contributions,
along with a high probability of plan full funding.
• The stakeholders should expect the plan design to meet regulatory
standards and scrutiny.
• The new plan design had to be matched with an effective and discip-
lined governance model.
• Pension beneﬁt payments would be paid in the form of lifetime guar-
anteed annuities.
• The new plan design had to deliver on the contractual pension promise.
The Mechanics of the UFCW Variable Deﬁned
Beneﬁt Plan Take Shape
The UFCW hybrid plan design had taken on form and structure by the end
of 2007. The Committee referred to its creation as the Variable Deﬁned
Beneﬁt Plan (Variable Plan); it later became known as the Adjustable
Pension Plan (APP). This plan was structured like a DB in that retirement
and longevity risks were pooled, and all assets were pooled and managed
professionally. But in contrast to a DB plan, the Variable Plan shared positive
and negative investment performance between the employer and plan
participants. The Variable Plan beneﬁt is deﬁned as the greater of two
beneﬁts calculated separately each year: a ‘ﬂoor’ deﬁned beneﬁt (that can
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be either a ﬂat beneﬁt accrual or salary-based career average formula), and
a ‘variable’ beneﬁt that ﬂuctuates depending on actual investment perform-
ance. Each year’s beneﬁt accrual can never be lower than the ﬂoor beneﬁt.
The ﬂoor beneﬁt is priced using a ‘ﬂoor interest rate’ plus plan demo-
graphics. An initial ﬂoor beneﬁt was modeled to be $600 per year (the
equivalent of $50 per month per year of service). The ﬂoor accrual does
not change due to plan investment experience. However, the Variable Plan
design anticipated that the ﬂoor beneﬁt accrual could be sensitive to chan-
ging plan demographics and would have to be recalibrated periodically. The
ﬂoor interest rate is also the performance benchmark for the variable
beneﬁt. The Variable Plan design envisioned setting the ﬂoor interest rate
at 4.5–5 percent, a rate 30–40 percent lower than the expected return rates
used by multiemployer private and public plans. The basis for the ﬂoor
interest rate was long-term corporate interest rates (of 20–30-year maturity).
The median corporate interest rate over the period 1919–2007 was 5.25
percent and the 25th percentile was 3.75 percent. In 2007, the average
corporate long term rate was priced at 4.7 percent.
The variable beneﬁt accrues in units (similar to RSP shares). Start-up unit
values are set at an arbitrary level (e.g. $10.00 per unit). Unit values are
adjusted each year based on actual investment returns compared to the
ﬂoor interest rate benchmark. Every year, the units earned equal the ﬂoor
accrual divided by unit value at the beginning of the year (e.g. units earned =
$600 divided by $10 = 60 units). The variable beneﬁt is then equal to the
number of units times the unit value. This structure is important because, in
combination with the ﬂoor beneﬁt, it complies with the deﬁnitely determin-
able beneﬁt accrual rules of ERISA, and it also allows for variable beneﬁt
changes year to year. In effect, participants are accruing units rather than
beneﬁt dollars.
With regard to the variable beneﬁt, the Committee created two rules for
surplus management, for the purpose of safeguarding plan funding. These
were as follows:
• Any surplus return in excess of a designated percent (e.g. 7–10 per-
cent) would be capped (‘Surplus Cap’) and not applied to the variable
beneﬁt. These excess returns would become a reserve or margin that
would be available as a contingency against future negative investment
performance.
• Excess returns earned below the Surplus Cap would be applied to the
variable beneﬁt by increasing unit values or units held (not by increas-
ing the ﬂoor accrual rate). This approach does not increase the mem-
ber’s ultimate beneﬁt, and as a result does not increase the employer’s
risk for unfunded liabilities. Issuing additional units provides the great-
est ﬂexibility for allocating excess returns through the variable beneﬁt.
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The Committee also applied the lessons of asset/liability leverage in matur-
ing plans discussed earlier, to the payment of retiree beneﬁts. A Variable Plan
would establish a policy that required the plan to annuitize or immunize all
retiree payments when they became effective. The goal was to insure the
retiree liability as best as possible, and to ensure that large asset/liability
mismatches would not occur; additionally, the intent was to preclude retiree
liabilities from dominating the plan’s balance sheet over time.
The Committee devoted much of its limited budget to testing the ﬁnan-
cial robustness of the Variable Plan. Two Canadian consulting ﬁrms with
insurance liability modeling capabilities were asked to recommend the most
efﬁcient investment strategy to deploy in order to meet the Variable Plan
objectives. The Committee had two objectives: to achieve a minimum return
of 5 percent each year with a risk parameter that anticipates a low standard
deviation of 5 percent; and to seek an excess return above 5 percent without
impairing the ﬁrst objective. After running a number of optimal asset
allocation strategies, the Committee selected a beta-test asset allocation
scenario that consisted of 5 percent cash, 36 percent investment grade
bonds, 8 percent below-investment grade bonds, 15 percent inﬂation-linked
bonds, 25 percent hedge funds, 10 percent real estate, and 1 percent
commodities. When back-tested within the limitations of historic ﬁnancial
information and capital market assumptions, this asset allocation portfolio
generated a 6.83 percent return with a standard deviation of 3.54 percent.
Using the most recent highly volatile period 1998–2009, the portfolio
returned on average 6.64 percent, including 5.96 percent in 2008, but
with all other years returning above 5 percent. The Committee enhanced
this strategy by adding a cash-matching Liability Driven Investment (LDI)
strategy that matched the plan’s projected liability cash ﬂows each year for
the next 20 years of liabilities. Stochastic modeling results suggested that this
combined strategy would generate plan surpluses consistently, allowing a
variable beneﬁt upside.
The Committee was satisﬁed that it had created the appropriate policies
and funding safeguards for the Variable Plan that fulﬁlled the original
objectives and principles for introducing a hybrid plan to its afﬁliate local
union ofﬁcers. This DB ﬂoor was priced conservatively, with upside beneﬁt
potential controlled by a surplus return cap, and with funding risk managed
by a ﬂexible unit value beneﬁt system and complimented by a low volatility
investment strategy anchored by LDI cash matching liabilities.
The Committee also discussed what could possibly go wrong with the
model, and it determined that the one uncontrollable factor in the future
of the Variable Plan pertained to governance and policy discipline. The
ultimate question was whether pension boards of trustees could break with
the conventional pension investment and governance practices of the
past, so as to instead adopt and enforce policies unique to the Variable
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/12/2015, SPi
134 Reimagining Pensions
Plan. The Committee was convinced that it could not legally bind boards
of trustees to the original policy rules of the Variable Plan. Only continued
trustee education and institutional memory could secure the future.
The UFCW Takes the Variable Plan Public
In January of 2009, the UFCW presented the Variable Plan for the ﬁrst time
to the employer members of the Joint Labor Management Committee of the
Retail Food Industry (JLMC). Established in 1974 by the organized super-
market companies along with the UFCW and the International Brother-
hood of Teamsters (IBT), the JLMC provides a forum for union and
company ofﬁcers to discuss strategic public policy and collective bargaining
issues. In a presentation about the pension crisis, the UFCW introduced the
Variable Plan concept as a potential solution for the industry. The employ-
ers were impressed with the union’s directness and the proactive nature of
the presentation. After the meeting, the Kroger Company, the largest
employer of UFCW members, invited the UFCW to present its analysis of
the pension crisis and the Variable Plan to its February 2009 conference of
Kroger trustees.
At the same time, the UFCW leadership mobilized an internal education
campaign to address solutions to the pension crisis. Presentations were
made to the UFCW’s two most important governing bodies, the UFCW
Executive Board consisting of 50 vice presidents, and the Local Union
Advisory Committee which accounted for about 80 local unions and coun-
cils not already represented on the Executive Board. The UFCW local union
leadership was receptive to the Variable Plan idea and appreciative that the
UFCW leadership and staff were taking the initiative by actively seeking
practical responses to the pension crisis. In May of 2009, the UFCW held a
one-day ‘Pension Summit’ for union trustees, at which the Variable Plan was
showcased and described in detail. Keith Ambachtsheer, Director of the
Rotman International Center for Pension Management at the University of
Toronto, was a guest speaker and offered expert guidance and support to
the UFCW’s efforts to renegotiate its pension contracts and establish the
new, more sustainable pension design model. During the conference,
UFCW trustees responded positively to the Variable Plan. Consensus sup-
port developed in favor of advancing the Variable Plan idea and beginning a
dialogue with employers.
Throughout 2009–10, the UFCWmet with its largest employers to present
the Variable Plan. In 2011, Kroger and the UFCW began a serious discussion
about restructuring four multiemployer plans covering 180,000 participants,
where Kroger was the dominant contributing employer (Blitzstein 2013). All
four plans were underfunded and certiﬁed red zone plans. Kroger was
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receptive to the UFCW strategy of issuing public debt to accelerate funding
of the legacy pension deﬁcits, with a cost of bringing these merged plans to
full funding of nearly $1 billion. The UFCW pressed for the adoption of the
Variable Plan, but Kroger rejected the hybrid plan because of the uncer-
tainty of the Variable Plan’s regulatory status and the cost of replicating
current beneﬁts using lower interest rates required by the Variable Plan.
Ultimately, the UFCW and Kroger reached an historic pension deal effective
January 1, 2012, with a new pension contract creating the UFCW Consoli-
dated Fund. This would be 10 years in duration, merge the four plans,
prohibit beneﬁt reductions during the contract term, establish a new
salary-based future service plan that targeted an agreed-to replacement
income, and commit Kroger to fully funding the plan and keeping it
green zone under PPA through 2022.
While the ﬁrst attempt to introduce the Variable Plan failed, the effort
served a purpose by giving the UFCW a level of bargaining leverage and
credibility with Kroger and other employers, supporting the union’s goals in
stabilizing four underfunded plans. Under the new pension deal with the
UFCW, the union conceded its ﬁduciary authority over the Consolidated
Fund’s investment policy. In contrast to the beliefs of the UFCW and many
pension experts, Kroger argued that it could manage the investment risk of
a traditional DB; the ﬁrm was also conﬁdent that its strong cash ﬂow and
balance sheet could absorb the investment risk of the Consolidated Fund.
The ten-year UFCW/Kroger pension contract will test Kroger’s theory and
resolve.
The Variable Plan Model Gains Acceptance
outside the UFCW
The Variable Plan has continued to gain attention in pension policy circles
and with the labor movement. It was presented to conferences sponsored by
the Pension Rights Center, as well as the Pension 20/20 Research Initiative
led by the Society of Actuaries (SOA). Several unions made inquiries about
the Variable Plan and a number of collectively bargained plans outside the
UFCW have adopted the Variable Plan. For instance, Variable Plans were
established by Hotel & Restaurant Local 26 in Boston, Massachusetts; the
Masters, Mates, and Pilots in Baltimore, Maryland; the Newspaper Guild (an
afﬁliate of the Communications Workers of America) with both the New
York Times and the Consumers Union; and the Sheet Metal Workers’
National Fund. In addition, the Maine Public Employees Retirement System
enacted legislation to adopt the Variable Plan for new hires from 2015.
The Variable Plan has also gained attention in other circles. The National
Coordinating Committee for Multiemployer Plans (NCCMP), the lobbying
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arm of the multiemployer community, presented Congress with a set of
proposals to reform the multiemployer pension system in 2013. These
proposals were based on the work of the Retirement Security Review Com-
mission which recently published its ﬁndings (see DeFrehn and Shapiro
2013). The section of the Commission study that promoted ‘innovation’
proposed that the Variable Plan be formally added to the IRS code. Add-
itionally, in Congressional hearings, the Variable Plan has gained a number
of endorsements from Congressional leaders and staff.
Conclusion
The US occupational pension system has experienced a painful and disrup-
tive decade. The retirement paradigm that emerged after World War II is
disappearing in the private sector, and it faces political and ﬁnancial chal-
lenges in the public sector. Recent Boeing/IAM negotiations in Seattle as
well as the Detroit bankruptcy provide further evidence of the unraveling of
the pension deal. The transition from the old to a new pension order has
been underway since 1980, accelerated recently due to major economic and
ﬁnancial crises. The future retirement security of tens of millions of Ameri-
can workers and retirees is in the balance.
While conventional economic theory often ignores or minimizes the
institutional role of unions and other pension stakeholders in the private
and public pension system, this case study of how unions approached the
retirement challenge will help determine the course of history for much of
the aging workforce. Constructing a fair and equitable pension deal can be
successful, as illustrated here. Jim Leech, the CEO of the Ontario Teachers’
Pension Plan, has recently highlighted the role that labor unions have
played in transforming pension plans in New Brunswick, Canada, and the
Netherlands (Leech and McNish 2013). The US labor movement, along
with other pension stakeholders, has an historic opportunity to revive the
pension contract in America.
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